It is well known that female age at first marriage positively correlates with male income inequality. The common interpretation of this fact is that marital search takes longer when the pool of potential mates is more unequal. This paper challenges that interpretation with a novel econometric method. I utilize the fact that the female age at first marriage was shown to be a sum of a skewed term, possibly related to search, and a normally distributed residual. I estimate search duration as the expected skewed term. I find that in the American data this term does not positively correlate with male income inequality and female education.
Introduction
A large body of studies documents a positive correlation between male income inequality and female age at rst marriage (Keeley (1977 (Keeley ( , 1979 , Bloom and Bennett (1990) , Danziger and Neuman (1999) , Loughran (2002) , Gould and Passerman (2002) , Coughlin and Drewianka (2011) , Yu and Yu (2013) , Li (2014) ). Generally, the literature interprets this correlation as a positive correlation between male income inequality and female marital search duration. This interpretation is made by assumption, intuitively inspired by the search theory. To the best of my knowledge, no empirical study tested this assumption until now. The reason is simple: search duration is an unobservable variable in almost every dataset. To close this gap, I propose a new econometric method that utilizes the contribution of Ansley Coale, one of the most prominent demographers of the twentieth century, who discovered the common age pattern of marriage across times and countries. Specically, I rely on the Coale-McNeil decomposition of the female age at rst marriage to identify a possible marital search duration. Coale and McNeil decompose the age of female marriage into a skewed term, possibly related to search, and a normally distributed residual. Using the American Vital Statistics for the age of marriage, I estimate the mean skewed term in 35 states for every year between 1968 and 1995. Using the Current Population Survey for income inequality, mean female education, and other covariates on the state-year level, I show that while residual male income inequality is positively correlated with mean female age at rst marriage, it may be negatively correlated with mean marital search duration. This surprising nding implies that the channel that links female marital search to male income inequality is not necessarily the one intuitively adopted by the literature.
Furthermore, female education is also positively correlated with female age at rst marriage, but by my method, it is found to be negatively or not at all correlated with marital search duration. This nding may be intuitively explained: while education is sometimes associated with a postponed entrance into the marriage market, the search for a mate is facilitated by interaction with classmates.
Moreover, women who enter the market at an older age may be under biological pressure to accept oers. Finally, the shorter marital search of higher-educated women may also be related to their increased attractiveness, leading to more frequent marriage oers.
2 This paper's identication strategy relies on the fact that female age at rst marriage in dierent countries and times is shown (Coale and McNeil (1972) ; hereafter CM) to be a sum of two terms: a skewed term (a convolution of a few exponential distributions) and a normally distributed residual.
The identication assumption is that the skewed term is related to marital search. This assumption relies on the association of the exponential distribution with the waiting time. The CM paper, Kaneko (2003) , and my ndings provide empirical support for this assumption. Particularly, CM show that in French data the skewed term is indeed related to duration of stay in the marriage market. Kaneko (2003) shows in Japanese data that the skewed term is shorter when marriages are arranged. In the present paper, I show that variables that may aect search and reservation values, particularly the male-to-female sex ratio and availability of divorce, are indeed correlated with the skewed term but not with the residual one. On the other hand, variables that are likely related only to the age of entrance into the marriage market, particularly the minimal legal age of marriage, are indeed correlated with the residual term but not with the skewed one.
Furthermore, I consider some theoretical concerns, particularly the question of whether withinstate variation across years in the residual male income inequality is the correct measure in the case of marriage market. Marriage rates may correlate with within-state inequality across years if they adjust to business cycles. This is a predictable relationship of marriage timing and inequality, but, to the best of my knowledge, there is no certain theoretical prediction about the relationship between search duration and business cycles. Therefore, within-state variation across years may be an inappropriate tool to test the search theory. This concern is addressed by considering longrun levels of income inequality, lagged values, and removal of state xed eects. While the former two alternatives do not alter the results signicantly, removal of state xed eects inates many coecients and some coecients change their sign. However, the negative eect of male inequality on the mean skewed term is found to be quite robust. The relative robustness of the eects on the skewed term also holds for other robustness checks, such as considering raw income instead of residual income. Moreover, the year xed eects are also more consistent over years once the mean skewed term and not the mean age of marriage is the dependent variable in the regression. All these 3 ndings may be seen as supporting evidence for a behavioral interpretation of the mean skewed term. Kaneko (2003) rewrites the CM marriage age density function such that it has a single shape parameter. This parameter is intuitive as it is directly related to the asymmetry of the marriage-age distribution. The shape parameter has a statistical interpretation. For example, for a certain value of the parameter the CM density function specializes to the extreme value distribution, while for another value it specializes to the normal distribution. In Section 6, I estimate the relationship between the variables of interest and the value of the shape parameter. I also provide examples of trends in the value of this parameter across years. The fact that dierent states have dierent trends serves as an additional illustration of the behavioral interpretation of the CM model.
The common link between the age of marriage and inequality is the well-known mean-preserving spread mechanism of search models. Under the mean-preserving spread, increasing the dispersion of oers raises the reservation value of the seeker and the higher reservation value leads to a longer search. In other words, the more diverse the population of potential mates is, the more selective the seeker is. This interpretation of the positive correlation between marriage age and inequality was adopted by the literature as being the most reasonable (Gould and Passerman (2002), Loughran (2002) , Coughlin and Drewianka (2011), Weiss and Santos (2015) ).
1 The present paper challenges this interpretation, emphasizing that age of marriage and marital search duration are not the same.
Also, a very large body of research in the social sciences discusses the relationship between female education and age of marriage (Bloom and Bennett (1990) , Goldin and Katz (2002), and Fiel and Ambrus (2008) are only few examples). However, to the best of my knowledge, the present paper is the rst to show that while female education positively correlates with female age at rst marriage, the possible correlation with marital search duration is negative or insignicant. This nding corresponds to recent studies by Chiappori et al. (2009 Chiappori et al. ( , 2015 , who structurally estimate to what extent the wife's education is an important contributor to the husband's utility. This large contribution may be one of the channels to the relatively short marital search due to the increased 1 A notable exception is Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) , who related male inequality to uncertainty in the marriage market in a framework without search frictions. 4 ow of oers when the woman is educated. Turning back to the CM model, it is noteworthy that its parameters are estimated with and without covariates in a few studies (Kaneko (2003), Bloom and Bennett (1990) ). However, to the best of my knowledge, no previous study uses the CM decomposition of age of marriage into both skewed and normal terms. Finally, the proposed method may be seen as a simple alternative to structural estimation of search models (see Eckstein and Van der Berg (2007) for a survey of the search-related empirical literature).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 claries the identication strategy. Section 3 introduces the CM model of standardized marriage schedules. Section 4 presents the estimation procedure. Section 5 discusses the main results and a set of theoretical considerations and robustness checks. Section 6 examines an alternative estimation procedure that uses a more recent version of the CM density function, namely, the one used in Kaneko (2003) . Section 7 concludes.
The identication strategy
Let Y be an observed random variable that consists of two unobserved parts, X and u, such that
In the context of the present paper, Y is the age of marriage of a woman, X is the duration of search for a spouse, and u is the residual. Furthermore,
where W is a vector of observed covariates. The focus of the empirical section of this paper will be on male income inequality and female education, included in W .
We are interested in the estimation of β. However, X is unobservable and the econometrician is restricted to using observable Y . The identication problem is in directly regressing
where η = u+ε. The issue here is a possible correlation between u and W . Obviously, the correlation between Y and W does not necessarily imply a correlation between X and W because the correlation between Y and W may simply follow from a correlation between u and W . In particular, higher income inequality may lead to a later entry into the marriage market due to, say, a longer investment in education and in premarital savings or an adjustment of the timing of marriage to the business cycle. In such cases, income inequality has little to do with search duration. Similar issues may arise in the case of unemployment duration and job search.
The convenient solution is to try to directly measure X or to seek some exogenous variation in W . Unfortunately, both solutions are not always feasible. This paper proposes a dierent approach.
The idea is that in some cases, X belongs to a known family of distributions. For example, if X is search, it is a convolution of waiting periods, which are likely to be exponential terms. Therefore, the proposed procedure is:
(i) Write Y as a sum of X and a residual term u.
(ii) Using the observed data of Y , calculate a set of estimates E(X).
The identication assumption is that the interpretation of X is unique. In the search context, the assumption is that only search may be a convolution of exponential terms. Specically, I utilize the CM nuptiality model. They show that the female age at rst marriage has the form of Equation (1), where X is a convolution of exponential distributions of dierent means, and u is a normally distributed residual term. CM back this identication assumption (they use the term interpretation) with evidence from a survey of French couples, showing that X is a close t to the duration of their stay in the marriage market. Further supporting evidence appears in Kaneko (2003) and in the present paper (see Sections 5 and 6). I follow steps (i)-(iii) above; in particular: (i) I adopt the CM decomposition.
(ii) Using the U.S. Vital Statistics, I estimate a panel of E jt (X) , where j is a state and t is a year. Research in Princeton, which he headed for a long tenure. He observes that female age at rst marriage follows a standard distribution, identical for dierent countries and cohorts. The only dierences lie in the minimal age of marriage, the nal proportion of those who eventually marry, and the age at which this nal proportion is reached. In other words, the schedule of marriages by age has a common functional form and the dierences between countries and cohorts lie only in the values of three parameters. Figure 1 shows the proportion of ever-married women by age for the Netherlands in 1859 and for Germany in 1910. The two curves seem dierent. However, Figure 2 redraws the two curves so that they have a common starting point, the nal proportion of those who eventually marry is one, and adjusting the horizontal scale such that this nal proportion is reached at the same age. As seen in Figure 2 , the two standardized curves practically coincide. Furthermore, Coale (1971) ts the standard schedule of risk of rst marriage (number of rst marriages of women of standard age x divided by the number of single women of standard age x) by the double-exponential function. He ts the function to the marriage schedule of Swedish women in the 1860s and obtains the following probability density function:
Thus, if marriages start at age a 0 and the horizontal scale is compressed by factor k, the risk at 
In a subsequent study, CM develop the statistical theory behind the function in Equation (2).
The idea is that a random variable with a risk function converging to a constant asymptote r can be stripped of at least one exponential term. This is done according to the identity
where F 1 (Y ) is the distribution after the exponential term has been removed. It is possible to repeat this exercise innitely many times because asymptotic risks in case of a double-exponential risk function remain constant after the removal of exponential terms. This leads to the nding that the female age at rst marriage (Y ) can be written as
Figure 2: Standardized female age of marriage in Netherlands, 1859, and Germany, 1910 Source: Coale (1971) .
where Z i are latent independent random variables exponentially distributed with E(
The parameters α and λ dene the shape of the curve. The role of these parameters turns intuitive by the fact that the ratio of α's and the ratio of λ's in two populations are both equal to the ratio of the standard deviations of the age of marriage in the two populations.
Thus, Y can be rewritten as Equation (1)
Furthermore, CM show that u converges very fast, as a function of m, to a normal distribution. Therefore, Y consists of an innite number of independent exponential terms with diminishing means. The sum of the few terms with relatively large means forms X, while the sum of the remaining sequence of exponential terms with negligible means forms the normally distributed residual. In the empirical analysis, CM set m = 3 and let u be a normally distributed term with a proper mean and variance. It is found to be an extremely good t to the empirical distribution of the female age at rst marriage (Y ).
Parametrization
Finally, CM prove that from Equation (3), it follows that the probability density function of Y is closely tted by
where Γ indicates the gamma function, ϕ = a + (1/λ)ψ(α/λ), where ψ = Γ /Γ is the digamma function, and a is simply the mean age at rst marriage. 2 CM t the standard curve by setting the parameters according to the standard schedule of marriages in Sweden in the 1860s. In the present paper, I calibrate the parameters such that the standard curve ts the actual age of marriage distribution for each state-year combination in the U.S. Vital Statistics.
Relation to search duration
As CM point out, the density function given by Equation (5) has possible behavioral implications.
Specically, CM interpret the standard schedule of rst marriage frequencies as the combination of normal distribution of attainment of marriageable age and three exponentially distributed delays.
In Section 5 I show that the (normally distributed) residual is, indeed, correlated with attainment of marriageable age. By contrast, the skewed term is not correlated with the minimal legal age of marriage.
2 This density function belongs to the family of general log gamma distributions (see Kaneko (2003) ).
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CM proceed with their discussion by considering empirical examples. First, they estimate the age of "entry" into the marriage market in the U.S. in the 1960s as 15.6 and the mean duration of the skewed part as 73 months. The age of 15.6 corresponds to the average minimal legal marriage age in the U.S. at that time. They proceed to the following interpretation of "entry" and "delay":
"We may conjecture that the age of becoming marriageable is the age at which serious dating, or going steady begins; that the longest delay is the time between becoming marriageable and meeting (or starting to keep frequent company with) the eventual husband; and that the two shorter delays are the period between beginning to date the future husband and engagement, and between engagement and marriage." 3.4 Further evidence of CM interpretation Kaneko (2003) nds that the standard marriage schedule of Japanese women born in 1935-1960 is more symmetric than the one implied by the CM standard curve. He gures out that this dierence may be explained by the prevalence of arranged marriages in Japan in those years. Once arranged marriages are removed and socio-economic covariates are controlled for, the schedule becomes much closer to the CM one. The suggested interpretation of this nding is that arranged marriages in Japan are behaviorally dierent from marriages in Western Europe used by CM to calibrate their 11 model. The behavioral interpretation here is similar to the one proposed by CM: the asymmetry of the marriage age density function is due to frictions in the marriage market. In particular, the frictions may be facilitated by arranged marriages.
Estimation 4.1 Calibration of the density function parameters
The CM density function, given in Equation (5), has three parameters because the standardization process described above has three degrees of freedom (minimal age of marriage, nal proportion of those who eventually marry and the age at which this proportion is reached). I calibrate the set of parameters {a, λ, α} jt for state j in year t, using the NBER collection of Marriage and Divorce
Data of the National Vital Statistics System of the National Center for Health Statistics.
3 I limit the sample to rst marriages of white women. The data in the collection covers the period from 1968 to 1995 for 35 states.
CM t the density function (Equation (5)) to the observed marriage schedules of cohorts of women. By contrast, I am interested in the year-place specic pattern, and, therefore, interpret the density function as a cross-state distribution of all rst marriages formed in state j in year t. As discussed already in Coale (1971) , the cohort schedule and the cross-section distribution are quite similarly well described by the density function given in Equation (5). Theoretically, one could calibrate CM's parameters for completed cohorts and then regress the estimated mean duration of the skewed term on the covariates in the year when the cohort was 16 years old (i.e., the age of "entry"
according to CM's calibration). However, such a procedure would generate only few observations because only cohorts born until 1955 may be considered as complete by 1995, the last year in the dataset. Moreover, the results of my analysis show that despite the dierent interpretation, the CM model ts the cross-state data very well, as we shall see later in this section.
The calibration procedure is:
3 Downloadable at http://www.nber.org/data/marrdivo.html.
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(i) Calibrate a jt as the mean age at rst marriage in state j in year t.
(ii) Calibrate {λ, α} jt by maximizing the log-likelihood of the density function (Equation (5)) using data of rst marriages in state j in year t.
The quality of t is measured by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-style statistic
whereF jt (x) is the observed cumulative frequency of rst marriages up to age x, and F jt (x) is the calibrated cumulative density. shows that the mean age at rst marriage is positively skewed, while the estimates of λ jt and α jt are distributed almost symmetrically. Despite the cross-state interpretation of the model, dierent from the original CM interpretation, and despite the t to the actual age rather than the standard one, the t is almost as good as in the CM paper. The quality of t statistic never reaches 0.1 and its median is only 0.02, while in the CM paper the absolute value of the area between the empirical and the tted standard curves is, similarly, 0.016.
Regressions
The main purpose of this paper is to compare the coecients of a naive regression, which means directly regressing the mean age of marriageȲ jt on a vector of covariates W jt (with main interest in male income inequality and female education) to the coecients of the regression of the estimated mean skewed term E jt (X) on the same set of covariates. The two regressions arē 
where γ j and δ t are, respectively, the state and year xed eects. The estimated mean of the skewed term, by Equation (4), is
I estimate Equation (7) for m = 1 and m = 3. The former value provides the longest skewed term, and the latter one is CM's suggestion for the total delay between entry into the marriage market and marriage. The larger m is, the smaller the residual term is, such that E(X) approachesȲ . The distribution of E(X) is shown in Figure 4 for dierent values of m. The histograms show that the estimated means of the skewed term vary from two to ten years. The estimated mean of the longest component (m = 1) is distributed almost symmetrically around 3.5 years but may be as long as 6.5
Figure 4: Distribution of E(X), the estimated mean of the skewed term years.
Covariates
The vector of covariates W consists of 24 variables, divided into four groups. All covariates relate to state j in year t. The rst three groups are calculated from the Integrated Public Use Microseries of the Current Population Survey (CPS) for years 1968 -1995 (Flood et al. (2015 ). The fourth group is adopted from various studies. The covariates are:
Group 1: Income. Six variables are included: mean, standard deviation, and cubic root of the third central moment of male and female residual logged personal income distributions. The residual is derived by regressing
where I ijt is the personal income (restricted to positive values 4 ) of individual i in state j in year t, married ijt and male ijt are dummy variables, and educ ijt is a vector of three dummies for advanced levels of education: high school diploma, some college, and college degree. The xed eects are year t and state j . 5
Group 2: Education. Six variables are included, which represent the proportion of men and women in each of the three educational groups listed above, in state j in year t.
Group 3: Sex ratio. Five variables are included, representing the male-to-female odds ratio at ages 16-19, 20-23, 24-27, 28-31, and 32-35 , in state j in year t.
Group 4: Laws. Seven variables are included:
-The minimal legal age of marriage. It consists of four variables: minimal age of marriage of males and females, with and without parental consent (Blank et al. (2009) ).
-A dummy for Early Legal Access (ELA), i.e., the availability of oral contraception for single childless women below age 21 (Bailey et al. (2011) ).
-A dummy for the possibility of no-fault divorce (Ashbaugh et al. (2002)).
-A dummy for legal abortion (Levine et al. (1999) ).
Because not all states appear in both CPS and the Vital Statistics for the same years, the nal dataset consists of 734 observations (year-state combinations). Summary statistics are presented in Table I . 4 An alternative is to set ln(I ijt + 1) as the dependent variable and to restrict the sample to non-negative incomes. However, the case of zero income is very age-related. Thus, such a regression would be sensitive to the restriction of the range of ages in the sample. Generally, the ln(I ijt + 1) specication provides similar signs of the coecients in the main regressions (Equations (6) and (7)) but of a smaller magnitude and statistical signicance than the ln(I ijt ) specication. 5 The specication in Equation (8) includes socio-economic variables that are generally associated in the economic literature with income premiums. The idea is that the residual income should be idiosyncratic and more closely associated with the search process. However, alternative denitions of residual income may exclude endogenous variables (education and marital status) and selection of women into the labor force (excluding women from the estimation of Equation (8)). Results with these modications are reported in the Supplementary Appendix. The limit case of these modications is the consideration of the raw income, rather than the residual income, discussed in Section 5.4. These modications have only negligible eect on the results. The results of estimating the regressions of the marriage age and its mean skewed part (Equations (6) and (7)) are reported in Tables II and III.   Table II shows the results of the xed-eects regressions with the standard errors clustered by state. Table III shows the results without state xed eects and the dierences between the two estimations are discussed in Section 5.3. Column 1 in each of the tables presents the results for Equation (7) for m = 1, i.e., the mean longest skewed term as the dependent variable. Column 2 presents the results for m = 3. Column 3 presents the results for Equation (6) , where the dependent variable is the mean age at rst marriage. Columns 4-6 repeat the estimation with the sample restricted to the 1968-1990 period, excluding the years of increasing non-marital cohabitation.
Identication
Before discussing the coecients of male income inequality and female education, let us focus on the coecients of some of the control variables. While these variables are not the main variables of interest in this paper, they are helpful in testing the identication assumption. These variables plausibly discriminate between age of entry into the marriage market and duration of marital search. They include sex ratio, age of legal marriage, and possibility of divorce. Sex ratio aects search as it determines the ow of meetings with available mates of the opposite sex. The results show that sex ratio (number of men per woman) is indeed correlated only with E(X) (columns 1-2 and 4-5). The correlation is mostly positive, indicating that a higher male-to-female ratio is associated with a longer waiting time (or a longer search). Theoretically, the longer search can be explained by the fact that the higher the male-to-female ratio is, the higher the selectiveness of the women is.
Furthermore, legal marriage age is related to the entrance into the market (see Iyigun and Lafortune (2016) , who use the minimal legal marriage age as an instrumental variable). Indeed, the results show that it is correlated withȲ but not with E(X). Interestingly, while the coecient of the minimal female legal marriage age without parental consent is intuitively positive, the coecient of the corresponding minimal male legal marriage age is negative. A possible explanation is that this eect is due to an omitted variable bias: a higher male legal marriage age (conditional on the female one) is associated with a more conservative social structure, which, in turn, is associated with a lower female age of marriage. Regarding other laws (ELA, divorce, abortion), no statistically signicant relationship with the female age at rst marriage is found (columns 3 and 6), probably because during the period covered in data the variation in these variables is small (see the summary statistics in Table I ). However, the coecient of the availability of no-fault divorce in columns 1-2 and 4-5 is statistically signicant and negative. Intuitively, in the context of search, women are more likely both to receive and to accept marriage proposals if marriage can be relatively easily dissolved.
Similar evidence of the eect no-fault divorce has on family formation and marital capital appears in Alesina and Giuliano (2006) , Drewianka (2006) , and Stevenson (2007) .
Main variables of interest
The main coecients of interest include those of male residual income and female education. Let us rst observe columns 3 and 6 of Table II, which correspond to the naive regression of the mean age at rst marriageȲ (Equation (6)). Consistently with the literature, the rst three moments of residual male income are positively correlated with female age at rst marriage. On the other hand, female income is found not to be related. The coecients are similar in the full and restricted samples.
Regarding education, the results show dierent coecients in the full and restricted samples. While for the period 1968-1995, male and female education has a strong and positive correlation with mean female age at rst marriage, for the period 1968-1990 the eects are smaller.
Let us now turn to the regressions of Equation (7), where the dependent variable is E(X) (columns 1-2 and 4-5). First, it is clearly observed how the results converge to the results of Equation (6) (columns 3 and 6) as m increases, because removing more and more exponential terms with relatively large means erodes the residual term. Note that CM set m = 3 in their empirical subsample ) subsample ) analysis, as the residual term for m = 3 is close to following a normal distribution.
Surprisingly, and contrary to the results of the naive regression in columns 3 and 6, the moments of male residual income are negatively associated with E(X). Furthermore, female residual income moments are statistically signicant, and the coecients are also negative (but smaller, in absolute terms, than the male income coecients). Regarding education, male education is not related to E(X), while female education is negatively related for m = 1, in contrast to its relation tō Y . For m = 3, education is mostly not statistically signicant. The interpretation is intuitive.
While education sometimes implies a postponed entrance into the marriage market, it may be associated with a shorter search. First, women interact with their male classmates, which increases the likelihood of meeting a future husband. Second, women may be under biological pressure to accept oers if they enter the market later. Third, a more educated woman is a more attractive mate, which leads to more frequent marriage oers. The fact that the statistically signicant negative correlation is observed only for m = 1 implies that only the largest exponential component (the longest delay) is negatively correlated with female education.
Importantly, the opposite signs are not a result of some mechanical negative correlation between
Y and E(X). On the contrary, the correlation is positive and high: 0.92 for m = 1 and 0.87 for m = 3. The correlation between E(X) and the residual term u =Ȳ − E(X) is also positive, but smaller: 0.34 for m = 1 and 0.46 for m = 3.
Sensitivity to state xed eects
Equations (6) and (7) include state xed eects. This is done for two reasons. First, considering geographical xed eects follows the previous studies (Gould and Passerman (2002), Loughran (2002) ). Second, state xed eects capture long-run social and economic dierences between states, correlated with inequality. However, in this case, state xed eects may also raise a problem. While state xed eects capture long-run or permanent dierences between states, regressions with these eects may fail to capture the true structural relationship between income inequality and age of 22 marriage. The within-state variation across years in income inequality is related to business cycles.
Because participation in the marriage market is a dynamic process, individuals may endogenously respond to business cycles by postponing marriage to better times. Thus, the positive relationship between marriage age and inequality may reect variation across business cycles while the theoretical relationship between business cycles and search duration is not evident. (6) and (7) after they have been reestimated without state xed eects. Some coecients are heavily inated by removal of state xed eects. This is not surprising because state xed eects explain some 15-20% of the cross-state variation in the mean age at rst marriage and in the mean skewed term. Moreover, some coecients change their sign. This is especially remarkable in columns 3 and 6, where the dependent variable is the mean age at rst marriage. In particular, the signs of the coecients of the moments of male residual income turn negative, contrary to what is observed in columns 3 and 6 of Table II . This is a result of omitting many of the variables previously absorbed by state xed eects. For example, adding the rate of urbanization to the regression without state xed eects reduces the amplitude of the negative coecient of male income inequality by 20%.
However, the results in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 are more robust to excluding state xed eects than the results in columns 3 and 6. The mean residual income is still negatively related to the longest skewed term (m = 1) and the coecient of the residual income standard deviation is negative but not statistically signicant. In particular, the coecients of the income moments in column 4, where the sample excludes the 1990s, are very similar to the corresponding coecients in Table II .
Furthermore, the coecients of the educational variables are also more robust to excluding state xed eects in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 than in columns 3 and 6. These results mean that the long-term or permanent dierences between states which are correlated with inequality are less related to the skewed term than to the residual one.
One way to visualize the dierence between the results with and without state xed eects as well as the dierence between the years before and after 1990 is to plot the year xed eects. These eects Figure 5 . We observe a positive trend in the year eects on bothȲ and E(X) starting in the early 1970s. However, the trend is sharper forȲ than for E(X). Under the identication assumption, this nding implies that the common factors that change over time are more related to the entrance into the market than to search frictions. There is a downward discontinuity in the year eects onȲ after 1990, which is not observed in the year eects on E(X). Furthermore, this discontinuity is sharper without state xed eects. The gure clearly shows that E(X) is a more consistent measure than mean age of marriageȲ . It serves as an additional justication for using E(X) to test theoretical hypotheses with regard to duration of stay in the marriage market.
Residual versus raw income
The measure of income inequality is computed as a residual that removes eects associated with the standard Mincer Equation as well as year and state xed eects (Equation (8)). Use of the residual serves two purposes. First, it is a better measure of individuals' permanent incomes, as opposed to their current incomes. For example, the cross-sectional standard deviation of incomes in a given state and year is aected by the population age distribution, but that variation should 24 not be relevant to marital search decisions because each individual (who does not die rst) will pass through the entire age distribution during his or her lifetime. Residual income after removal of covariates such as age and education is likely to be permanent and thus more relevant to marital search. Moreover, residual income is associated with (unobservable by the econometrician) personal traits that are not as easy to search for as age and education. Therefore, the relationship between residual inequality and marital search duration is directly related to search eorts, as emphasized in search theory. Table IV presents the results of estimation of Equations (6) and (7), with and without state xed eects, using moments of raw income instead of residual income. Again, the coecients in Equation (7) reported in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 are found to be more robust than the coecients in Equation (6) reported in columns 3 and 6. While the eects of the mean and standard deviation of male income on the mean age of marriage, reported in columns 3 and 6, are not statistically signicant, the eects on the mean skewed term, reported in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5, are quite similar to the results in Table II . Without state xed eects, the coecients of Equation (7) are mostly smaller in absolute terms than those in Table III .
Estimation using long-run and lagged income inequality
An issue related to state xed eects is considering long-run average levels of income and income inequality and considering lagged mean and standard deviation of income. The long-run income mean and standard deviation remove uctuations related to business cycles. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of the marriage process should incorporate the lagged levels of inequality because individuals are single only if they did not marry earlier. Table V Tables II and III . The lagged mean residual income (Table VI) provides coecients of the same sign as the current mean residual income but of a smaller magnitude. The lagged standard deviation is not statistically signicant in a regression with xed eects and has a positive eect on the skewed term in the regression without state xed eects (column 4 in Table VI ). This is the only place throughout the regressions in this paper where we observe a positive and statistically signicant eect of male income inequality on the mean skewed term of female marriage age.
Age structure of the population
Young participants in the marriage market may be more patient than older ones. This notion suggests that the eect of inequality on the average age at marriage should vary with the age distribution of the population. In particular, it would suggest the need to add to the regressions 26 interaction terms between inequality and the mean age of young men and women.
Thus, I reestimate regressions including, in addition to the baseline variables, the mean age of men and women between 16 and 40 years old. These two variables are added separately and in interaction with the standard deviation of the residual income of males of the same age range.
The results with state xed eects are clearer than the results without them, and they are in line with the prediction. A larger age gap between men and women in the population (older men, younger women) is associated with a shorter search: the coecients of age without interaction with inequality in columns 1 and 2 of the table are negative for the male age and positive for the female age.
However, this eect diminishes when male income inequality rises: the coecients of the interaction terms have the opposite sign of the coecients without interaction. In particular, the eect of the interaction between male income inequality and mean female age on the mean skewed term is negative. Under the identication assumption, this result means that an older female population has a lower reservation value in the marital search paradigm, conditional on the mean male age. The mean male age has the opposite eect: the coecient of the interaction with inequality is positive.
The interpretation is that the search of women for a husband takes longer when the male population is both older and more unequal, conditional on the mean female age. The corresponding eects on the mean age of marriage (columns 3 and 6) are not statistically signicant. Estimation without state xed eects provides results that are not statistically signicant with regard to the female age but are similar to the xed eects regression results with regard to the male age.
6 Estimation using single shape parameter An intuitive alternative way to see the relationship between the asymmetry of marriage age distribution and covariates such as male income inequality and female education is to utilize the fact that the CM density function given in Equation (5) belongs to the family of general log gamma Kaneko (2003) ). The shape parameter of the GLG distribution is related to CM's shape parameters α and γ in the following way:
The GLG family includes many well-known distributions. For instance, when δ →0, it converges to the normal distribution and when δ=-1 it specializes to the extreme value distribution. According to CM's original calibration of the parameters that t the Swedish cohorts of the 1860s, δ=-1.287.
The closer δ is to zero, the more symmetric the distribution is. For instance, Kaneko (2003) nds that Japanese women who married after World War II have a value of δ slightly above -1, which means a more symmetric distribution than that in CM. This, he argues, can be explained by be- is quite similar to the value of Japanese women estimated in Kaneko (2003) . In Florida, the upward trend is also observed but the values are lower than in Connecticut and never reach the CM value.
In Louisiana,δ is quite constant and is very similar to the CM value. Finally, in Utah the trend is downward: it starts close to the Japanese (or the later Connecticut) value and decreases to the CM value.
Figure 6: The trends in the single shape parameter I further estimate Equation (7) withδ as the dependent variable. Table VIII presents The results are very much in line with the results in Table II , but deviate from the results in Table   III . In regressions with state xed eects, a higher male income, male income inequality, and the third moment of the male income distribution are associated with a higher value ofδ, which means a more symmetrical distribution of the age of marriage and, according to the behavioral interpretation, a shorter search. Without state xed eects, the eect of male income inequality is negative, which means a longer search. Female education is also associated with a more symmetrical distribution, with a moderate dierence when state xed eects are removed. In summary, the results imply a less asymmetric distribution of female marriage age as a function of the main variables of interest (male inequality and female education) when the regression is estimated with state xed eects.
Under the identication assumption, this relationship means a shorter marital search. 
Concluding remarks
This paper's empirical results show that contrary to the intuition adopted by the literature, female marital search duration is not necessarily positively correlated with male income inequality and female education. The actual correlation may be negative or at least ambiguous. One possible explanation of this nding is that increasing inequality is associated not only with a dierent reservation value but also with a dierent search strategy. Furthermore, the results correspond to recent research on female marriage return to education, as women in regions with a larger share of educated females are suggestively found to experience a shorter marital search. This nding may be attributed to a lower selectiveness of these women or to their increased attractiveness.
The empirical strategy proposed here relies on the identication of a latent variable (marital search duration). The identication assumption is that a certain component of the female age-atrst-marriage distribution has a unique interpretation. Specically, the identication assumption is that the skewed convolution of exponential terms relates to search. This identication assumption is supported by the empirical nding indicating that the sex ratio and divorce laws are related only to this skewed term. On the other hand, the minimal legal marriage age is found to be related only to the residual term, which may be interpreted as the age of entry into the marriage market.
The alternative specications and robustness checks show that the coecients of the variables of interest on the mean skewed term are more robust than the coecients on the mean age of marriage.
Moreover, the year xed eects are also more consistent once the mean skewed term and not the mean age of marriage is considered as the dependent variable. These ndings imply that the mean skewed term is a relatively robust measure of the marriage market paradigm.
A question that is left for further research is why the age of marriage positively correlates with residual male income inequality. If it is not explained by marital search duration, this positive correlation needs an alternative explanation. My ndings imply that this correlation is mediated by the residual term, which may be related to the age of entry into the marriage market. A possible channel that links male inequality with later marriage is uncertainty. Empirically, Gottschalk and Mott (2009) and Mott and Gottschalk (2002 , 2012 , who analyze data from the 1960s to 1990s, nd that almost half of the inequality in the income of American men is due to transitory shocks. The residual income is stripped of some of the permanent factors and gives more weight to the transitory shocks. Indeed, the coecients in Table II where residual income is considered are of a larger amplitude than in Table IV where raw income is considered. From a theoretical perspective, Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) show that one does not need to assume search frictions to explain a positive relationship between inequality and age of marriage if at least some of the inequality is related to uncertainty about future incomes of young men. However, their model assumes an exogenous dierence between men and women in order to address a large spousal age gap. In my data from American Vital Statistics from 1968 to 1995, the mean spousal age gap is relatively small and not very volatile. It is 2.5 years in the late 1960s, increases to 2.9 in the mid-1980s, and then decreases to 2.6 in the 1990s. The relatively low level and small volatility of the spousal age gap is consistent with the idea that entry into the marriage market is delayed when uncertainty is high.
Women do not marry men who are much older; instead, they wait until the uncertainty about their coevals is resolved.
The second important result is the negative relationship between male inequality and female duration of search. This result is not surprising once we take into account that some fundamental parameters of the search mechanism may be dierent when the level of inequality is higher. A more unequal society should be more stratied. If search is within classes (Burdett and Coles (1997) and Smith (2006) develop a theory where marital search is endogenously within classes) the search pools are smaller in the case of a more stratied society. Smaller pools may be easily associated with a shorter search. Moreover, a very unequal society converges to one where the marginal cost of marrying a wrong partner is very high and competition over proper marital partners is intense.
Even though an extremely stratied society is more related to the pre-industrial epoch than to
America between the 1960s and the 1990s, the period analyzed in this paper, it can be seen as a theoretical limit case. Because of the intense competition over partners within the narrow class, an extremely stratied society is more likely to observe arranged marriage. In such a case, the search is under pressure to be short and takes place as early as possible, even before the mate (especially if it is a girl) reaches a marriageable age.
Finally, the proposed method is in fact a simple alternative to structural estimation. A serious limitation of structural models is the diculty of the estimation. A model is generally a set of 34 simultaneous equations with implicit functions of interest. Because of the complicated nature of economics, structural models that produce a closed-form probability density function of the variables of interest are rare. Thus, estimation generally cannot be easily replicated by an inexperienced reader. Moreover, some of the model's structural assumptions are motivated by computational concerns. Therefore, the need for a simple alternative is compelling. The method proposed in this paper may serve, in some cases, as such an alternative.
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